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THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY AGENCY
C. PAUL ROGERS II1*
The merger of two or more independent business enterprises into
a single business entity is anathema to the underlying policy of our
economic system-the promotion of competition. This is particularly
true when the merging businesses are direct competitors' or when a
business joins with a supplier or a customer,2 for it is then that restraints
on competition are most likely to occur. The storied antitrust legisla-
tion known as the Sherman Act3 and the Clayton Act4 were intended
to be legal checks on restraints of competition and monopolization of
industries. Section 7 of the latter specifically prohibits any corporation
from absorbing all or any part of another company "where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect thereof may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly."5
This provision, intended to restrict monopolistic tendencies in their
incipiency, 6 requires a strict legislative enforcement policy against
mergers which restrain the freedom of choice so vital to competition.
The consolidation and merger of companies in regulated industries
presents different policy considerations than do mergers in nonregu-
* Member of Hiscott, Robinson & Rogers, Stroudsburg, Pa.; B.A., J.D., Univer-
sity of Texas.
1. Consolidation between direct competitors is known as horizontal integration.
Direct competitors can be generally defined as business entities which offer the same or
similar products for sale for profit in the same or in close geographic proximity.
2. Consolidation between a business entity and a supplier of the business is known
as vertical integration.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
4. Id. §§ 12, 13, 14-27, 44 (1970).
5. Id. § 18 (1970). See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging
of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
6. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
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lated sectors of the economy. Regulation of an industry generally
develops when it is determined that some type of monopolistic market
structure is better suited to obtain maximum efficiency in an industry
than the traditional competitive system. The regulating agencies which
are established, generally seek at least some competitive objectives as
well as additional performance goals peculiar to each industry. Each
regulatory agency functions under statutory enactments unique to that
regulated sector. 7  The "public interest" is usually the primary objec-
tive emphasized by the statutes.8
Regulated sectors of the economy are regulated because the com-
petitive system does not maximize the "public interest." In order to
attain this maximization, restrictions are placed on competition in the
particular industry such as restricting the freedom of entry, rate regula-
tion, and control over areas of operation. Herein lies the dilemma
regarding mergers in the regulated sectors: Mergers typically have
anti-competitive impacts on an industry, depending of course on the
size of the merging firms and on the structure of the industry. The
antitrust provisions applicable to the merger situation were designed to
promote competition.' Competition is restricted in industries regulated
by federal statute. The quandary results from the problem of applying
pro-competitive antitrust provisions against anti-competitive mergers in
an industry in which competition is restricted, at least to some degree.
Regulatory agencies thus face the problem of applying antitrust provi-
sions emphasizing freedom of competition in an industry where
competition is restricted by law. This article will concentrate on how
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission
approach and handle this problem, as applied to the transportation
industry, the statutory guidelines within which they have to work, and
the view the federal courts take of their determinations in this complex
area.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The threshold question to be answered is what is the statutory role
7. See Einhom, Antitrust and the Conglomerate Movement: An Alternative from
the Regulated Sector, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 451 (1970).
8. An example of this is the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
9. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), is frequently referred to as
the "anti-merger statute." See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930);
United States v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), afl'd, 418 U.S.
906 (1974); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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of regulatory commissions when two companies within a regulated
sector desire to merge. Generally, a merger proposal must be submit-
ted for approval to the appropriate agency. These agencies have
absolute statutory authority to approve or deny any merger proposal, 1°
subject only to review by the federal judiciary. Congress, recognizing
the need for regulation of the economic structure of regulated in-
dustries through control of acquisitions, consolidations and mergers,
enacted an amendment to Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act"
which gives the CAB supervisory power over one seeking to acquire
control of an air carrier. This extended the CAB's jurisdiction to any
noncarriers or entities outside the aeronautics industry attempting to
gain control of an air carrier 2 and closed a substantial loophole in the
Board's authority over air carrier mergers. Since regulatory agencies
are authorized to approve or deny any merger within their regulatory
jurisdiction, the agencies must enforce antitrust policy if it is to be en-
forced at all. But the role of antitrust laws in regulated mergers is
more complex than a simple inquiry into whether the various commis-
sions apply antitrust law when considering a prospective merger.
Generally, a merger is exempt from antitrust law upon approval by
the regulating agency. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, restricting
mergers which have a tendency to lessen competition or create a
monopoly, exempts itself from application to transactions consummated
pursuant to authority given by the regulatory agencies, including the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission.' 3
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act specifically exempts transac-
tions, including mergers approved by the Commission, from the opera-
tion of antitrust laws.' 4 The effect is that agency approval of a merger
in a regulated sector shields the transaction from antitrust attack even
if it is violative of the anti-monopoly statutes. 5
10. E.g., Federal Aviation Act, § 408b, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970); Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970).
12. See Rasenberger, Control of an Air Carrier By 'Any Other Person'-Flying
Blind Under the Federal Aviation Act, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 65 (1971).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
14. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1970).
15. But this is not to say that regulatory commissions may ignore the anti-
competitive aspects of a proposed merger. The Justice Department, always attempting to
promote competition, is frequently an intervening party in agency proceedings. See, e.g.,
United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970). Section 408b of the Federal Aviation Act
provides that the Civil Aeronautics Board cannot approve any merger which would
restrain competition or result in the creation of a monopoly. 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970).
Furthermore, Section 1la of the Clayton Act gives the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the
1975]
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While Section I1 a of the Clayton Act' authorizes regulatory bodies
to enforce the section 7 prohibition against mergers which restrict
competition or tend to create a monopoly, the agencies must addition-
ally look to the special legislation appropriate in their regulated sector
to determine what role Congress has required competition to play in
the consideration of merger proposals. As will become apparent, the
role of competition may vary significantly among the various regulated
sectors of the economy.
First, it is important to note a fundamental tenet of the decision mak-
ing process in the formulation of mergers in regulated industries. To
the extent that an agency applies the same antitrust criteria to proposed
consolidations that a court would, one decision maker is merely substi-
tuted for another. The antitrust exemptions of approved mergers in
many regulated sectors are then insignificant because the agencies
apply the same standards as the courts. But to the extent an agency
applies different principles to merger applications than would a court,
the agency can confer true immunity from later antitrust attack. In this
circumstance the regulatory body has a distinct role, for antitrust
considerations may be skirted and mergers may be consummated which
have definite anticompetitive effects. As illustrated below, agencies
frequently do apply different principles but judicial review often acts
as a check on attempts to completely circumvent antitrust policy.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act 17 authorizes the Interstate
Commerce Commission to approve a proposed transaction to merge or
consolidate which will be consistent with the public interest. Section
5(2)(c) specifies that the Commission, in passing upon any proposed
transaction, shall weigh the effect the transaction may have on adequate
public transportation service, and the effect that the inclusion or failure
to include other railroads in the involved territory may have on the
public interest."' There is no mention in the statute of what role, if
Federal Reserve Board authority to enforce compliance with Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
18. Id. § 5(2)(c) (1970). The specific language of the statute provides the follow-
ing guidelines which the Commission must consider when ruling on proposed mergers
and consolidations:
(1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to
the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to in-
clude, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the
[Vol. 7:297
MERGERS IN REG ULA TED INDUSTRIES
any, the maintenance of competition is to play in the Commission's
determinations. This omission, coupled with the exemption from anti-
trust laws of mergers approved by the Commission, seems to evidence
a Congressional policy that antitrust considerations take a back seat to
considerations which the Commission considers to be in the public
interest.
McLean Trucking Litigation
In the landmark case of McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,19
the Supreme Court attempted to articulate the role of competition and
the antitrust laws in consolidation proposals before the regulatory
agencies. Involved was a motor carrier merger proposal of eight large
carriers with both horizontal and vertical aspects, from which would
emerge the nation's largest trucking concern. Although the Commis-
sion's order authorizing the consolidation was not set aside, the Court's
interpretation of Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act has become
instrumental in subsequent adjudication involving all mergers governed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1959 the Supreme Court
specifically held the McLean interpretation of section 5 applicable to
railroad mergers.
20
The merger in McLean was opposed by the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department, and by numerous competing carriers on the ground
that it would unduly restrain competition in the motor carrier industry.
The Interstate Commerce Commission acknowledged that substantial
competition between the involved carriers would be eliminated by the
merger but held that section 5 was intended to permit consolidations
which would, absent approval, result in restricting competition contrary
to antitrust laws, where advantages in the public interest overcome the
anti-competitive aspects of the merger.2" Further, in a detailed
analysis of the territories involved in the merger, the Commission con-
cluded that ample competitive motor carrier service would remain.2
total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of
the carrier employees affected.
Id. § 5(2) (c). It is important to note that the above statutory considerations are not
exclusive. The Commission may consider other factors believed relevant when making a
decision involving consolidations or other proposed transactions.
19. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
20. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1959).
21. Associated Transport, Inc.--Control and Consolidation-Arrow Carrier Corp.,
38 M.C.C. 137, 150 (1942).
22. Id. at 159-60.
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The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission, holding that the
national transportation policy, as set forth in the Interstate Commerce
Act, is the Commission's guide to what constitutes the "public interest"
in consideration of a merger proposal.2 3  Even though the policies
expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act are to be the basic determi-
nants for action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it is not
required to ignore competitive aspects of prospective consolidations.
While "the premises of motor carrier regulation posit some curtailment
of free and unrestrained competition, '24 the preservation of competi-
tion is a consideration to be weighed in the attainment of the national
transportation policy.
25
In summarizing the role of competition in regulated mergers the
Court emphasized that the decline in competition resulting from con-
solidation must be balanced against such considerations as improved
service, safer operation and lower costs in the Commission's determina-
tion of what will benefit the public interest.2 6 Thus, McLean precludes
the Interstate Commerce Commission from ignoring antitrust policies
in determining whether a merger is consistent with the public interest
under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission
clearly must give some weight to the competitive aspects of a merger,
although the Court left the matter largely to the Commission's discre-
tion.
2 7
While the Interstate Commerce Commission has specific legislation
and Supreme Court decisions interpreting that legislation to serve as
guidelines, the Commission must of necessity be particularly influenced
by the economic structure of the railroad and motor carrier industries.
This is reflected by the Court's pronouncement in McLean that the
weight to be given the diminution of competition in balancing the
several factors making up the public interest is a matter for the
expertise of the Commission. Stated differently, the ICC, within its
23. The Supreme Court's statement of the national transportation policy was an-
nounced in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1944).
24. Id. at 82-83.
25. The fact that Congress had conferred immunity from antitrust prosecution on
carriers participating in an approved merger does not relieve the Commission of its duty
to consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the general competitive
situation in the industry. Id. at 87.
26. Id. at 87.
27. For helpful discussions of McLean see C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN REGULATED
INDUSTRIES, TRANSPORTATION § 5.24 (1961); Helmetag, Railroad Mergers: The Accom-
modation of the Interstate Commerce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. REV. 1493,
1527-28 (1968); Lindahl, The Antitrust Laws and Transportation, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
37, 53-55 (1966).
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statutory guidelines, is free to formulate policy regarding mergers and
consolidations according to what it determines will be most beneficial
to the industry. This does not preclude a different approach being
taken for railroads than for motor carriers, since the industries may not
be identical in economic structure and well-being.
Railroad Mergers
A brief consideration of the recent economic difficulties of the rail-
road industry, combined with a look at Commission and federal court
decisions, should illustrate the dependency of ICC policy regarding
mergers on the economic condition of the industry. The much
publicized railroad merger movement began in the mid-fifties. Behind
the movement is an industry-wide reaction to the financial setbacks
which have befallen railroads since the post World War II boom. The
basic reason for this decline is probably the increasing competition of
other forms of transportation with the railroads, that is, increasing inter-
modal competition. For example, the percentage of ton-miles of
freight carried by the railroads dropped from 68.19 percent in 1946
to 43.24 percent in 1961, while at the same time the trucking industry
increased its percentage from 7.28 percent to 23.1 percent. During
this period operating revenues for the railroads fell from 70 percent
of total revenue of surface carriers to 50 Percent.28
The decline in the financial fortunes of the railroads, however, has
not been caused solely by increased intermodal competiton. No control
of entry into the industry existed until the Transportation Act of 192029
was passed. This was well after the number of operating railroads had
become too large for regulation to be effective. Parallel rail routes and
28. Fulda, Antitrust Aspects of Recent Transportation Mergers, 48 MINN. L. REV.
723, 725 (1964).
29. 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970), provides that:
No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall undertake the extension of its
line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or
operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation
under this chapter over or by means of such additional or extended line of railroad,
unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certifi-
cate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will re-
quire the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional
or extended line of railroad, and no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall
abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and
until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the
present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 5 of this title shall be considered to prohibit
the making of contracts between carriers by railroad subject to this chapter, without
the approval of the Commission, for the joint ownership or joint use of spur, indus-
trial, team, switching, or side tracks.
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duplicate terminal facilities were commonplace in the early 1900's
because railroads had a virtual monopoly on transportation; thus the
railroads had only to compete against themselves. But considering cur-
rent traffic volume and increased intermodal competition, these dual
facilities may be inefficient at a time when railroads need to reduce
costs to a minimum.
The railroad industry in deference to formidable intermodal competi-
tion and rampant inefficiency within its own ranks has sought mergers
and consolidations as a remedy. The choice is a logical one. Competi-
tion in the industry has shifted from intramodal to intermodal. Rail-
roads, by consolidating with one another, are better able to compete
with competitors outside the industry. Consolidation allows the now
limited resources of railroads to be combined in a unified effort to com-
pete with the intermodal competitors. Railroads believe that mergers
can increase operational efficiency and at the same time reduce
expenses by such factors as the elimination of duplicate facilities.
While more profits will result for railroads, transportation, it is argued,
will also profit because railroads will be able to reallocate their
resources to new equipment and technological advances. 0
As noted before, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been
given wide discretion by the Supreme Court in its consideration of mer-
ger proposals. This enables the Commission, within its statutory
boundaries, to be guided in its decisions by what it considers to be best
for the industries which it regulates. The Commission has propounded
no specific policy regarding railroad mergers and decides cases on a
case-by-case approach, but the recent Commission decisions indicate
that the agency favors consolidation as a remedy for the sagging railroad
economy. Indeed, the ICC seems to be taking an increasingly liberal
approach to railroad mergers with the result that competiton, at least
intramodal competition, is becoming less important in determining
whether the public interest will be served by prospective mergers.
The recent railroad merger boom often has involved the acquisition
of a financially weak road by a stronger one. 1 In these types of cases
the Commission often justifies a substantial lessening of competition
between the merging lines because it is in the "public interest" that
30. See Helmetag, Railroad Mergers: The Accommodation of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. REV. 1493, 1528 (1968).
31. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R.-Control-Lehigh Valley R.R., 317 I.C.C. 139 (1962);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Baltimore & 0. R.R., 317 I.C.C. 261 (1962).
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a railroad is kept from going bankrupt. The 1960 merger of the Erie
& Delaware Railroad with the Lackawanna & Western involved
two financially weak roads.12  The Commission recognized that com-
petition between the two lines was substantial. Competitive main lines
existed between New York City and Buffalo, and the two lines served
55 common stations between the two terminals. However, the Commis-
sion permitted the merger, holding that the strengthening of the weak
roads was in the public interest, and that strong competiton from other
railroads and other modes of transport would continue. 33 Further, the
Commission believed that the features of the merger which eliminated
competition between the two applicants would also provide greater
allocation of resources and greater efficiency of operation through
elimination of duplicate plants, facilities and operations.
Such determinations by the Commission have been commonplace.
In addition to allowing consolidations between two weak lines and
between weak and strong lines, the Commission has also authorized
mergers involving two end-to-end roads. 4 The elimination of some
competition, even substantial competition, has normally been author-
ized if the proposed merger was in the public interest. It is increas-
ingly apparent that showing a merger is beneficial to the railroad
industry suffices to meet the public interest requirement.
The Commission's liberal attitude toward rail mergers has resulted
in consolidations between strong parallel roads in the late 1960's, even
though competition between railroads was virtually eliminated in large
geographic areas or in several metropolitan centers. In Florida East
Coast Railway v. United States3 a federal court upheld ICC approval
of a merger between two prosperous parallel lines which eliminated
competition in 81 percent of Florida's railroad mileage. The infamous
Penn-Central merger virtually eliminated competition in 32 urban
centers.36 This merger has been considered by some to be a watershed
because it established that a rail carrier with significant market power
in a large area could be created despite the resultant elimination of
interrail competition.
7
32. Erie R.R. Merger, 312 I.C.C. 185 (1960).
33. Id. at 246-48.
34. See Norfolk & W. Ry. and New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R.-Merger, 324 I.C.C. 1
(1964).
35. 259 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Fla. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 8 (1967).
36. Penn-Cent. Merger and Norfolk & W. Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 493
(1968).
37. R. FELLMETH, TiH INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 76 (1970).
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Northern Lines Merger
The Northern Lines merger of 1970 may be the furthest step yet
taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 8 The merger in-
volved three large, healthy lines which were competitors. Final
Supreme Court approval of the consolidation allowed two of the longest
and strongest parallel lines in the western United States, the Great
Northern Railway and the Northen Pacific Railway, to join together.
The newly formed giant had more miles of track than any other rail-
road in the country. The Commission considered predicted fixed cost
savings and service improvements resulting in prospective rate re-
ductions and more efficient routing to be of prime importance in grant-
ing the merger. Intramodal competition was found not to be greatly
affected despite the fact that no effort was made to define the product
or geographic markets of each road and despite the fact that Great
Northern and Northern Pacific were largely competitive parallel lines.
Little attention was given to the strength of the merging roads or to
the relative strengths and competitive effects on other competing rail-
roads. The Commission's basic premise throughout was that intra-
modal competition should not be a primary element for consideration
but that efficient allocation of national transportation resources is the
primary objective. 9
The ICC seemed to suggest that consideration of intermodal rather
than intramodal competition is more relevant in merger proposal evalu-
ations. While the exact emphasis placed on intermodal competition is
difficult to ascertain, the Commission stated in Northern Lines that
intermodal competition was relevant in determining the degree to
which competition would be eliminated by the merger. Thus, sub-
stantial elimination of intramodal competition could be offset by inter-
modal competitive conditions remaining adequate.40
It is interesting to note a fundamental change in Commission policy
occasioned by the Northern Lines litigation. In the first merger hear-
ing in which the Commission denied permission to consolidate, it was
held that the object of the Transportation Act was not to encourage
mergers but to permit them only if they were shown to be in the public
38. Great N. Pac. and Burlington Lines-Merger-Great N. Ry., 328 I.C.C. 460
(1966), modified on rehearing, 331 I.C.C. 228 (1967), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
39. 331 I.C.C. at 245-46.
40. Id. at 273.
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interest." The Commission stated that there was no presumption
favoring mergers; the burden was on the petitioning parties to establish
that the mergers would further the public interest and not result in a
substantial lessening of competition.42 On rehearing the Commission
allowed consummation of the merger on essentially the same facts
implicitly holding that the preservation of competition is no longer
necessary to the public interest and the primary objective of the Trans-
portation Act was the achievement of efficiency and optimal resource
use. 4 3  The second decision restated the Commission's view of the
policy objectives of the act and concluded that mergers which are con-
sistent with the public interest should be encouraged.44 Thus the ICC
changed its position drastically by assuming that, in absence of evidence
to the contrary, the public interest would be served by railroad
mergers.4 5
The Northern Lines case indicates that the Commission, while
previously sympathetic to mergers, can now be said to be practically
encouraging consolidations where it is shown that the public interest
will be enhanced. A prime consideration in the evaluation of the
public interest is a look at whether the railroad industry will benefit,
although the Commission never expressly makes that inquiry. Thus,
it is apparent that the Interstate Commerce Commission's role in the
regulation of railroad mergers has been heavily influenced by the
economic condition and needs of the industry. The Commission's
policy has turned a complete about face from the early part of the cen-
tury when railroads were king. The Commission rarely authorized a
merger and rejected some proposals which, with substantially the same
facts, have been approved during the recent merger increase. 4, So
41. Great N. Pac. and Burlington Lines-Merger--Great N. Ry., 328 I.C.C. 460,
555 (1966), modified on rehearing, 331 I.C.C. 228 (1967), af'd sub nom. United States
v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
42. Id. at 522-23.
43. 331 I.C.C. 228, 245-47 (1967), modifying 328 I.C.C. 460 (1966).
44. 331 I.C.C. 228, 269 (1967). It was stated that:
The prior report approached this case under the view that the policy of section 5
• . . was something other and less than 'to foster and encourage' rail mergers ...
Upon reexamination . . . we conclude that the policy of the act is clearly to facili-
tate and thereby foster and encourage consolidations which can be shown to be
consistent with the public interest.
Id. at 269.
45. See id. at 269; Note, 56 IowA L. REv. 362 (1970).
46. E.g., ICC v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 I.C.C. 618, 619 (1930); ICC v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 160 I.C.C. 785 (1930); Control of Virginian Ry., 117 I.C.C. 67 (1926)
(merger of two strong roads denied). In the first two cases the Commission held as a
somewhat distinguishing factor the fact that control of a railroad had been acquired
without ICC approval.
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while often validly criticized the Commission is heavily influenced by
changes in the industries which it regulates.4 7  Mergers are promoted
because they are seen as a way to strengthen the railroad industry from
within and to combat increasing intermodal competition.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND AIRLINE MERGERS
The Civil Aeronautics Board regulates the air carrier industry and
any merger attempt between two or more airlines must first be
approved by the Board.48  The Board and the Interstate Commerce
Commission have the same general regulatory power over mergers but
there is a definite substantive difference in the specific regulatory
legislation. While Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act makes
no mention of the role of competition in regulated consolidations,
Section 408b of the Federal Aviation Act directs that the Civil
Aeronautics Board shall not approve any merger which creates a
monopoly and restrains competition. 49  Under both statutes, however,
the "public interest" is the guiding consideration to be accorded merger
proposals. But, as will be subsequently pointed out, factors making up
the public interest may differ.
The regulatory duties of the CAB are much less complicated than
those of the ICC. The Civil Aeronautics Board oversees approximately
a dozen major air carriers. These airlines have little competition from
surface transportation for passenger traffic; the competition is largely
intramodal. On the other hand the Interstate Commerce Commission
must regulate all the railroads, the domestic water carriers, and the
thousands of interstate truckers, all fiercely competitive with each
other.
The Civil Aeronautics Board, while stressing the anticompetitive
aspects of consolidations, has also been responsive to some extent to
the changing needs of the airline industry. Traditionally the Board has
sought to maintain what it considers an optimum level of competition
in the air carrier industry. The industry is made up of the very com-
petitive Big Four-American Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United
47. See generally R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970).
48. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(1) (1970); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1973).
49. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970). The specific language of the statute provides that
the Civil Aeronautics Board "shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, ...
or acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and
thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the
consolidation, merger, purchase, . . . or acquisition of control. . . ." Id. § 1378(b).
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Airlines, and Eastern Airlines-plus approximately ten smaller carriers
which are competitive with the Big Four on a regional basis, and
numerous local service carriers which have very limited territorial
operations and normally receive federal subsidies. Until recently the
Board has sought to maintain the basically oligopolistic structure of the
industry by permitting few mergers, particularly if a member of the Big
Four was involved. Additionally, the Board has attempted to keep the
industry from becoming overly competitive by severely restricting
entry.
50
The Board has historically approved consolidations only in very
limited circumstances, such as where there were no conflicts of com-
petitive interest between the applicants. In two early cases, United-
Western Air Express51 and American-Mid-Continent Airlines,52 the
Board formulated its restricted approach to airline mergers. In each
case the large size of the proposed surviving carrier and its power to
control connecting traffic, thus adversely affecting competing airlines,
played a leading part in the Board's disapproval of the proposed trans-
action.
One of the factors considered important by the Board in rejecting
the American-Mid-Continent proposal was the fact that the two exist-
ing systems had a small amount of integration; that is, their routes were
relatively uncomplimentary. The Board felt that the light exchange of
traffic between the applicants weighed heavily against allowing the
merger.53 The Board also considered the size and competitive position
of American to be of prime importance, although disavowing any intent
to restrict expansion by American in all circumstances. American was
noted as being the largest domestic carrier. The addition of another
system, though a small one, to a carrier of American's size and competi-
tive position was considered anathema to the policies embodied in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of promoting sound economic conditions and
competition to the extent necessary to assure the development of an
50. See C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, TRANSPORTATION § 5.24
(1961); Keyes, Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. AIt
L. & CoM. 357, 361-62 (1971); Lindahl, The Antitrust Laws and Transportation, 11
ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 53-55 (1966).
51. United Air Lines Transp. Corp.-Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., 1
C.A.B. 739, 746, 751 (1940).
52. American Airlines, Inc. Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
7 C.A.B. 365, 377-78, 386 (1946).
53. There was a 4.03% exchange of passengers with Mid-Continent provided by
American, and 3.36% of revenues were provided by exchange with American. Id. at 374.
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air transportation system in the public interest.54 The Board also ex-
pressed the need to regulate air transportation in such a manner as to
improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air
carriers.5"
A decisive factor in the rejection of the United-Western Merger pro-
posal was the prospective elimination of competition between the par-
ticipant carriers, a factor not considered in American-Mid-Continent.
The consolidation would have eliminated Western as the only north-
south carrier in the territory west of the Rocky Mountains, and would
have given United an unhealthy predominance in the area.5 6 It is in-
teresting to note that while United's rank of the fourth largest domes-
tic carrier was mentioned in the Board's opinion, the weight accorded
to this fact, if any, was not evident.
5 7
Almost without exception all the early mergers meeting Board
approval involved some aspect of "the failing company doctrine." In
other words the Board's principal motive in approving the combinations
was a hope of improving the financial condition of one or more of the
participants. For example, the first three mergers approved all in-
volved carriers which were either bankrupt or were operating at sub-
stantial deficits. Northeast Airlines was permitted to acquire May-
flower Airlines, a company which had not operated for five years and
had been adjudged bankrupt. 8 Trans World Airlines absorbed a
carrier, Marquette Airlines, which had operating deficits of more than
$200,000 and had inferior equipment and infrequent, unreliable ser-
vice. 9 Similarly, Inland Airlines was shown to be unable to become
a viable competitor and merged with Western Airlines.6" The three
mergers did not eliminate any parallel service nor was potential com-
petition foreclosed between the participants.
The Board's policy of favoring mergers in which the failing company
doctrine played a significant part was further fostered in the 1950's.
In fact the Board struck out on a policy of encouraging carriers in fi-
54. Id. at 378.
55. Id. at 372. A merger of Mid-Continent with Braniff was subsequently author-
ized. Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708, 709 (1952).
56. United Airlines Transp. Corp.-Acquisition-Western Air Express Corp., 1
C.A.B. 739, 7,50 (1940).
57. Id. at 740.
58. Acquisition of Mayflower Airlines, Inc. by Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B.
680, 682 (1944).
59. Acquisition of Marquette by T.W.A., 2 C.A.B. 1, 11-13 (1940).
60. Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 654, 663
(1944).
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nancial straits to merge and it even attempted to find suitable airlines
to absorb failing companies."' As is normally the case, the Board had
a reason for these efforts. The late forties witnessed a sharp decline
in the earnings of domestic trunklines, occasioned by the failure of the
demand for passenger air service to match the growth in capacity for
carriage. The reversal stepped up the Board's efforts to seek out op-
portunities for economic improvement through intramodal transactions
such as mergers and acquisitions. Apparently some pressure had been
brought to bear on the Board by both governmental and industrial pub-
lications alleging that the financial difficulties of many carriers had been
largely attributable to regulatory policies resulting in excessive compe-
tition."2 In 1950 the Board investigated the feasibility and desirability
of bringing about the merger of air carriers where such consolidations
would improve the structure of the air transportation map of the county,
and would substantially benefit the public.6"
The case of Colonial Airlines64 illustrates the Board's policy of en-
couraging mergers which improved the financial condition of a carrier.
The early 1950's found Colonial heavily dependent on federal subsidies
with no chance to become self-sufficient. The Board encouraged an
acquisition of Colonial by an economically stable carrier. Ultimately
the Board had to choose between two carriers, National and Eastern.
Preliminary agreement to merge was reached by Colonial and National,
but Colonial's stockholders rejected the proposal. The Board agreed
that either a Colonial-National or a Colonial-Eastern consolidation was
in the public interest but favored the Colonial-Eastern combinations be-
cause it would provide a more efficient integration of the two systems.
Also, a Colonial-Eastern merger would have resulted in less revenue
diversion from National than would have been suffered by Eastern if
National and Colonial had merged. 65 An additional consideration was
that immediate integration could be accomplished since both com-
panies' shareholders had ratified the plan, thus saving the federal gov-
ernment an $850,000 annual subsidy payable to Colonial.
The American-Mid-Continent case was not mentioned in the opinion
although the cases had striking similarities. Both proposed consolida-
61. E.g., Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, National-Colonial Integration
Investigation, 18 C.A.B. 781 (1954).
62. See Keyes, Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J.
AiR L. & COM. 357, 361-62 (1971).
63. C.A.B. ANN. REP. 2 (1950).
64. Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, National-Colonial Integration Investiga-
tion, 18 C.A.B. 781, 784 (1954).
65. Id. at 782.
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tions involved a member of the Big Four and a much smaller, finan-
cially troubled regional carrier. The large size and dominant competi-
tive position of the acquiring carrier was not determinative in the
Colonial case as it had been in the American-Mid-Continent opinion.
In allowing the merger with Eastern, the Board's desire to alleviate
Colonial's financial problems was decisive; indeed, the Board had been
actively seeking a merger for Colonial. The divergence in policy
exemplified by the two cases 8 years apart emphasizes the extent to
which the Board is influenced by changes in the economics of the air-
line industry.
Merger authorizations were frequent among air carriers from the late
forties until 1956 when, in addition to the Colonial-Eastern integration,
six mergers were consummated.6 6 The principal motive behind the ap-
proval of the consolidations was a hope of economically improving at
least one participant of each merger. Not all the the carrier take-overs
during this period involved failing companies; several carriers offered
promise of competing in the future with the carriers with which they
merged. 7 In many cases in which mergers were ultimately con-
summated the Board actively sought partners for one of the partici-
pants.
6 8
Following the merger fad of the early 50's, a period of general pros-
perity for airlines prevailed except for a short-term reversal in the early
1960's. The reason for the lean period was just as in the previous de-
cade: the rate of growth of capacity for carriage pushed far ahead of
rate growth of actual traffic. Jets, with their larger seating capacities
and increased costs, were pervading the industry, and there was no par-
ticular reason for passenger revenue to keep pace. The Board, again
under some pressure to promote mergers, publicly encouraged carriers
to arrive at voluntary consolidation arrangements and indicated its will-
ingness to consider promptly any merger agreements presented. 69 An
investigation was even undertaken evaluating the possible modification
of air services between the southern and northeastern areas of the
66. See Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323, 401 (1955); Delta-
Chicago and Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 706 (1952); West Coast-Empire
Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 977 (1952); Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15
C.A.B. 708 (1952); Arizona-Monarch Merger, 11 C.A.B. 246, 276 (1950); Monarch-
Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33, 38 (1949).
67. See Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323, 377 (1955); Braniff-
Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708, 728-29 (1952).
68. Keyes, Notes on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. An
L. & CoM. 357, 364 (1971).
69. C.A.B. ANN. REP. 26 (1962).
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United States, although nothing practical resulted. 70
Despite all the favorable talk and the brief economic decline, only
one merger was approved between 1956 and 1967.71 That merger was
a direct result of the extremely perilous financial position of Capital
Airlines. Capital had undergone serious financial loses for five consec-
utive years and was unable to finance the purchase of the new jet air-
planes. This resulted in curtailment of service and its share of total in-
dustry traffic falling from 6.3 percent to 4.9 percent in two years.
Further, Capital was faced with a $34 million foreclosure suit for equip-
ment already in use. Unless something was done the carrier was faced
with immediate extinction.
Capital had applied for a federal subsidy, but the Board questioned
the legality of such an expenditure. 72  Traditionally, subsidies had
been available only to the smaller, financially weaker, local service
carriers. The larger trunklines, such as Capital, had never received
federal funds. In addition the Board seriously doubted whether a sub-
sidy, even if available, could be made in an amount sufficient to restore
Capital as a viable air carrier since it required an estimated $100 mil-
lion worth of new equipment alone. Accordingly, the Board stated it
would not endorse the needed subsidy absent legal compulsion.73
Thus the Board felt that it had no practical alternative but to approve
a merger between Capital and United Airlines if Capital were to sur-
vive in fact if not in name. Capital was then the fifth largest domes-
tic carrier, and the CAB believed that its stabilization was important
to the industry. The Board was unwilling to gamble on uncertain
remedies and was confident a merger with a powerful carrier such as
United would provide the greatest promise for a successful solution.
In approving the consolidation the Board held that the public interest
in preventing Capital's collapse outweighed all the disadvantages
caused by the merger. 74  The "falling business doctrine" was specifi-
cally applied. The adoption of this doctrine was held to override the
consideration of whether the merger violated the first proviso of Sec-
tion 408b of the Federal Aviation Act, prohibiting approval of a mer-
ger which would result in a tendency to create a monopoly or a restraint
of competition. It is unlikely that the United-Capital proposal, involv-
70. Competitive Trtmkline Service Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 434, 438, 461 (1964).
71. United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307, 410 (1961).
72. Id. at 311.
73. Id. at 311.
74. Id. at 409.
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ing a combination of one of the three largest domestic carriers with the
fifth largest carrier, could have withstood the antitrust scrutiny of sec-
tion 408b under normal circumstances. The Board in applying the fail-
ing business doctrine, however, made it clear that the doctrine was not
to be freely used to avoid the antitrust consequences of purported
mergers but rather was to be employed only in narrow circumstances
when one party has serious financial problems and the prospects for
rehabilitation are so remote that complete business failure is likely.7"
The United-Capital Merger Case again illustrates the flexibility of
regulatory agencies. The Civil Aeronautics Board was able to deviate
from its standard procedure regarding merger proposals and approve
a merger in order to save a large carrier from extinction.
The air carrier prosperity of the mid 1960's was followed by a
decline in the latter part of the decade. Again traffic growth failed
to keep pace with the increase in capacity for carriage. Four mergers
have been approved since 1967 and in each case the Board saw the
proposed transaction as a means to improve the economic well-being of
one or more of the participating carriers. Three of the mergers in-
volved local service carriers76 while the fourth, not ultimately con-
summated, was a combination of trunklines. 77 The principal considera-
tion favoring the consolidations of the local service carriers was the
Board's desire to reduce the increasing federal subsidies required for
the small carriers to operate.78
The local service carrier mergers did not result in the elimination
of any existing point-to-point competition but the contiguous position
of the participating carrier's routes did make them outstanding poten-
tial competitors. This aspect of competition has traditionally been ig-
nored, but in the Air West case79 the CAB recognized the elimination
of potential competition as a factor to be weighed in the consideration
of consolidation proposals. Potential competition would seem to be
75. Id. at 309-10.
76. Allegheny-Lake Central Merger Case, 48 C.A.B. 664, 670 (1968); Bonanza-
Pacific-West Coast Merger Case, 48 C.A.B. 380, 385 (1968); Frontier-Central Merger,
47 C.A.B. 489, 492 (1967).
77. Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, C.A.B. Orders Nos. 70-12-162, 70-12-163
(1970).
78. C.A.B. ANN. REP. 1 (1968). The Board noted in its annual report for 1968 that
the three local service carrier mergers would produce immediate subsidy reductions of
$503,000; $676,000; and $902,000.
79. Air West Airlines emerged from the combination of three local service carriers,
Bonanza, Pacific and West Coast Airlines. Bonanza-Pacific-West Coast Merger Case, 48
C.A.B. 380, 387-90 (1968).
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within the ambit of the section 408b antitrust provisions. It is puz-
zling that the Board had not earlier recognized potential competition
as an important factor to be considered, but of course a strict policy
regarding potential competition could negate some of the positive
aspects of proposed mergers and force the CAB into a less flexible
position. If the effects of consolidations on potential competition were
always considered, the Board would have a more difficult time justify-
ing economically advantageous mergers which do not qualify for the
application of the failing business doctrine.
Until recently the Supreme Court had never had occasion to review
a Board decision regarding a merger and had never construed Section
408b of the Federal Aviation Act. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, ° however, the Court determined that the CAB alone has the
power, subject to judicial review, to decide if acquisitions of control of
an air carrier meet the standards of competition and monopoly provided
by section 408b. While this holding is not surprising, the Court's fur-
ther delineation of the CAB's supervisory powers are quite significant.
The Court stated that the CAB has a continuing power, where it has
authorized control of an air carrier by another entity, to oversee, and
if necessary alter, the manner in which control is exercised.8' The
Board also has investigatory powers and supervisory authority over
specific transactions undertaken by the new parent company. This sur-
veillance is exclusive of the governmental forces that invoke the anti-
trust laws, although the Board must continually appraise the effect on
competition and possible monopolization which the authorized acquisi-
tion or consolidation may have.
While all the ramifications of this opinion are not yet evident, the
decision definitely is authority for expanded regulation by the CAB of
mergers and their aftermath. The specific holding of the case is an
attestation to this. The Court held that transactions of Hughes Tool,
promulgated after Hughes' acquisition of control of T.W.A., involving
T.W.A. and challenged by T.W.A. as violative of antitrust laws, were
under the Civil Aeronautics Board's control and surveillance; the trans-
actions thus had immunity from the antitrust laws. 2
80. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
81. Id. at 389.
82. Id. at 369. It is essential to point out that while the roles of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board in regulating mergers within
their respective sectors are perhaps typical of the duties exercised by regulatory bodies
over consolidations generally, Congress and the Supreme Court have mandated far less
pervasive controls for other agencies. n California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) part of
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CONCLUSION
The competition which our free enterprise system promotes and the
regulation of competition arising from the regulated sectors of the
economy appear at least superficially to be mutually exclusive. In the
real world of which our society is a part, regulation and competition
must be complementary devices. Thus it is the role of the regulatory
agency to determine the appropriate place competition is to play in the
regulated sectors. As has been demonstrated, the various agencies in
making this determination are influenced by a variety of factors. Each
agency has distinct and separate legislation with which to work. Within
these statutory guidelines, however, the agencies are accorded a wide
discretion in formulating policy subject only to judicial review. Regula-
tory commissions have the sole power to approve merger proposals, and
it is in these situations, although decided on a case-by-case basis, that
policy formulation plays a large role.
The policy articulated by regulatory commissions in their merger de-
cisions is to a large extent dependent on the economic state of the par-
ticular regulated sector. Policy can thus change as the financial condi-
tion of an industry changes, and the agencies are greatly influenced by
the needs of the industry over which they preside. Consolidations have
been thought to provide a remedy for a sagging industry; during an
economic recession agencies frequently permit mergers which would
not be considered in a healthier economy. Regulatory bodies are often
persuaded to grant unlikely mergers in order to help a particular corn-
the extended El Paso Natural Gas litigation, the Supreme Court struck down an FPC
approved merger between El Paso and a pipeline company. The Commission had
proceeded to approve the merger while a suit challenging the validity of the transaction
under the antitrust laws was pending in a federal court. Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act
gave the FPC jurisdiction over the acquisition of assets of natural gas companies leaving
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the federal courts the control over stock acquisitions.
15 U.S.C. § 717f (1970). Since the case at hand involved a stock acquisition, the
Supreme Court held that the Commission should have awaited the court decision before
proceeding. The Court further pointed out that approval of the merger in the situation
explained above would not bar an antitrust suit challenging the merger. California v.
FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 489 (1962). See also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 291
F. Supp. 3 (D. Utah 1968), vacated sub nom. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969).
Thus, the Federal Power Commission has little regulatory power over certain types of
mergers. Antitrust policy is entrusted solely to the courts, in contrast to the situation in
the air carrier and rail industries where antitrust policy is entrusted to the regulatory
body. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the El Paso case ignored the FPC finding that any
lessening of competition by the consolidation was not substantial, pointing out only that
the Commission had exceeded its authority. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 490
(1962).
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pany, even in times of relative prosperity, if that company's well-being
is considered important to the industry as a whole.
The methods of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil
Aeronautics Board have afforded excellent illustrations of the way
regulatory agencies operate. For example, the Interstate Commerce
Commission was adamant regarding the preservation of competition
within the railroad industry during the first decades of this century.
Railroads were king with little outside competition, and the Commis-
sion was primarily concerned with protecting the many small operators
from being consumed by large powerful roads. In contrast, the Com-
mission has reversed its position in recent years due to increasing inter-
modal competition and the failure of many lines which have severely
weakened the industry. Consolidations have been looked to as a cure
for the economic woes and as a way for railroads to better compete with
the increasingly powerful intermodal competitors."3 The Commission
has approved railroad mergers at such a rate and in such diverse cir-
cumstances that it has been suggested that the Commission's present
role is but a passive one subject to the wants of the industry.84
In contrast to railroads, the air carrier industry has not yet experi-
enced significant intermodal competition. The statutory controls relat-
ing to commercial airlines, unlike those relating to railroads, emphasize
the preservation of competition as a standard to be applied to consolida-
tions. Railroads are generally considered more of a natural monopoly
than are air carriers because of the wasted resources necessary to build
parallel tracks and facilities. Competition is more prevalent in the air
carrier industry because of lower fixed costs and because the number
of airlines on each route can easily be adjusted to changes in the volume
of traffic. There are other basic economic differences in the two trans-
portation sectors. For instance railroads must utilize their own re-
sources to provide terminal facilities and roadbeds while the govern-
ment provides airway facilities, including airports.8 5
The Civil Aeronautics Board has traditionally been concerned with
83. Only intramodal consolidations have been considered, while intermodal transac-
tions, a phenomenon of growing importance in the railroad industry, have been omitted.
Regarding the air carrier industry, intermodal mergers are similarly beyond the scope of
this article. Moreover, the inquiry was limited to domestic carriers which eliminated
consideration of attempted mergers involving international carriers such as Pan
American.
84. R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 84 (1970).
85. See Lindahl, The Antitrust Laws and Transportation, 11 ANTIRusT BuLL. 37
(1966).
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maintaining a significant level of competition within the air carrier in-
dustry. The industry has a substantially concentrated market structure,
dominated by the four largest carriers, but competition among the few
is deemed essential.
In respect to merger applications, the Board has consistently opposed
any transaction which would strengthen a member of the Big Four,
evincing a fear that any more economic power in the Big Four would
substantially damage the smaller competitors and create a truly oligo-
polistic industry. There have been exceptions to this policy. In two
instances the Board has permitted a member of the Big Four to merge
with a smaller carrier (once with the fifth largest domestic carrier); in
both cases the merger was necessary to prevent a financially distressed
airline from crumbling. Further, the Board's overall policy regarding
mergers has been greatly influenced by the industry's economic condi-
tion. Recently, as when the industry suffered a similar decline, the
Board has authorized several consolidations in order to strengthen small
carriers. In these periods of heavy merger activity, some consolidations
are consummated which ordinarily might not be approved. The anti-
competitive aspects of the transaction, while not totally ignored, are
generally outweighed in such situations by the Board's desire to
strengthen either a particular carrier or the industry as a whole.
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